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Abstract: This paper is an outgrowth of the filings in the FCC's broadband openness 
proceeding that focused on the issue of networks neutrality. Newly available data confirm 
that competition in the broadband access marketplace is limited. Wireless broadband 
access services are unlikely to act as effective economic substitutes for wireline 
broadband access services and instead are likely to act as a complement. Nor will 
competition in the Internet backbone marketplace constrain "last mile" broadband access 
providers. The last mile's concentrated market structure, combined with high switching 
costs, provides these providers with the ability to engage in practices that will reduce 
social welfare in the absence of open broadband rules. Allowing broadband providers to 
charge third party content providers will not necessarily result in lower prices being 
charged to residential Internet subscribers. The effect of open broadband rules on 
broadband provider revenues is likely to be small and can be either positive or negative. 
Price discrimination by broadband providers against third party applications and content 
providers will reduce societal welfare for numerous reasons. This reduction in societal 
welfare is especially acute when price discrimination is taken to the extreme of exclusive 
dealing imposed on content providers. Antitrust and consumer protection laws are 
insufficient to protect societal welfare in the absence of open broadband rules. 
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Providers of residential broadband transmission access networks have 
significant market power that, in the absence of regulation, can be used  
to impose fees on content providers and limit efficiency and innovation 
Providers of last mile broadband access networks have significant market 
power for a number of reasons. 1 First, residential customers typically can 
                       
(*) This paper supplements my paper, "Why Imposing New Tolls on Third-Party Content and 
Applications Threatens Innovation and Will Not Improve Broadband Providers' Investment" that 
was filed with the FCC on January 14, 2010 in GN Docket No. 09-191 (ECONOMIDES, 2010a), 
published in Jorge PEREZ MARTINEZ (Ed.), Net Neutrality: Contributions to the Debate. 
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choose from only two providers of last mile broadband access - a 
telecommunications company and a cable television company. FCC data, 
the opinion of the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ"), and even 
filings by economists attached to comments opposing open broadband rules 
substantiate the existence of this "duopoly." 
Second, the academic literature, as well as DOJ, strongly supports the 
position that a duopoly market confers greater market power and ability to 
charge higher prices and to engage in other anticompetitive practices than 
markets with more competitors. In the broadband context, market power 
possessed by residential broadband access network providers allows them 
to impose fees on content and applications providers to the detriment of 
social welfare. Third, customers face significant switching costs when 
changing Internet access providers. This confers additional market power on 
access network providers and would confer this market power even if the 
number of access network providers was larger.  
Fourth, once a customer has subscribed to a broadband access network 
provider's services, the customer is effectively "captured" and can be used to 
extract surplus from the other side of the network. This is akin to the 
terminating monopoly problem of voice telecommunications networks. Fifth, 
similar concerns about abuse of market power also apply within the wireless 
market, and there is only a limited possibility that wireless broadband 
services will constrain wireline broadband duopoly providers' market power. 
Wireless broadband is not an effective economic substitute for fixed (wired) 
broadband and does not constrain wireline duopolists' market power. 
Wireless itself is not robustly competitive, and has high barriers to entry and 
high switching costs. Furthermore, the two largest wireless carriers are also 
among the largest wireline broadband providers. This implies that the 
wireless market severely limits the wireless affiliate's incentives to constrain 
the market power of the other wireline duopolist. Moreover, consumers face 
significant switching costs that are technology- (e.g., having to pay for a new 
handset) and contract-based (e.g., long-term contracts with exit penalties) 
that limit competition among wireless providers. 2  
                       
1 This is in contrast with the opinion of some commentators who argue that there is significant 
competition in the last mile broadband access market. See e.g., SCHWARTZ (2010, p.  6); 
BECKER & CARLTON (2010, pp. 5, 12). 
2 The effective tying of wireless service with handsets implies that customers who change 
providers have to pay for a new handset even when it is not technologically necessary. Nicholas ECONOMIDES  3 
Residential broadband access competition is limited. Several sources in 
addition to those cited in ECONOMIDES (2010a) provide evidence of the 
duopoly nature of wireline broadband service competition. According to FCC 
(2009), "At most 2 providers of fixed broadband services will pass most 
homes." 3 Citing this, DOJ (2010, p. 13) asserts "[t]he enormous sunk cost of 
wireline broadband networks makes it unlikely that additional wired 
broadband competitors will enter many geographic areas other than those 
with the greatest density of users." The FCC's National Broadband Plan 
explains: "Given that approximately 96% of the population has at most two 
wireline providers, there are reasons to be concerned about wireline 
broadband competition in the United States." (FCC, 2010b, p. 37, "National 
Broadband Plan"). Recent FCC data on broadband deployment at the 
census tract level confirms this. For services with download speeds from 3 
mbps up to 6 mbps, DSL and cable modem services have 93.6% share. 4 
For speeds from 6 mbps up to 10 mbps, DSL and cable modem services 
have 99.7% share (FCC, 2010, p. 14, Chart 11). FAULHABER & FARBER 
(2010, p. 11), who filed for AT&T in the FCC proceeding, also recognize the 
duopoly nature of the market: "We would be remiss in not mentioning that in 
most markets, there are only two wireline broadband ISPs." SCHWARTZ 
(2010, p. 6), who also filed for AT&T, refers to the residential broadband 
market's "duopoly structure in many local areas." Moreover, due to the 
speed limitations of at least one of these options, many areas effectively 
have only a single choice. As FCC (2009, p. 135) states, "50 - 80% of homes 
may get speeds they need from one provider," and "in areas that include 
75% of the population, consumers will likely have only one service provider 
(cable companies with DOCSIS 3.0-enabled infrastructure) that can offer 
very high peak download speeds." (National Broadband Plan, p. 42) 
Duopoly implies greater market power and higher prices. Almost all 
theoretical economic models show significant reductions in market power 
and prices as the number of active firms increases.  5 The relationship 
                       
3 FCC September Commission Meeting slides, Sept. 29, 2009. 
http://www.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2009/db0929/DOC-293742A1.pdf (p. 135). 
4 Similarly, DOJ (2010) at 6 observes, "[i]n the near term, it appears reasonable to expect that 
most consumer demand will be met by services offering actual speeds of 3 - 4 Mbps. Over the 
long term, consumers may demand substantially greater speeds to take advantage of newer 
applications, such as HD video streaming."  
5 The major exception is Bertrand oligopoly with perfect substitutes (identical products) and no 
fixed costs, market frictions, or switching costs. In such a model, entry beyond two firms does 
not affect price because a perfectly competitive outcome with zero profits results even with two 
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between number of firms and market power has been tested empirically in 
studies that structurally estimate entry and evaluate its impact on pricing and 
profits. 6 These studies confirm the positive relationship between 
concentration and market power, as evidenced by prices charged and profits 
earned. 7  
DOJ recognizes the importance of the number of firms in enhancing 
consumer welfare.  
"Based in large part on its extensive experience in evaluating 
horizontal mergers, the Department starts from the presumption that in 
highly concentrated markets consumers can be significantly harmed 
when the number of strong competitors declines from four to three, or 
three to two. This same experience teaches us that consumers can 
enjoy substantial benefits when the number of strong competitors rises 
from two to three, or three to four, especially if the additional 
competitor offers products based on a new and distinct technology." 
(DOJ, 2010, p. 15).  
Fewer firms in an industry not only generally leads to higher prices, but 
also facilitates explicit and implicit collusion. Fewer firms lower the 
                       
transmission does not fit this simplistic model. There are significant frictions and switching 
costs, and providers have significant fixed costs and reap significant profits. 
6 These studies use the observed number of firms in different-sized markets to infer the firms' 
variable profits. The advantage structural empirical models of entry is that they are carefully 
done and are not subject to significant criticisms of earlier empirical literature on the relationship 
between concentration and prices. For a discussion of the limitations of this earlier literature, 
called the Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm, see CARLTON & PERLOFF (2005, 
pp. 265- 267). 
7 BRESNAHAN & REISS (1991, p. 977) estimate the effects of the number of firms on pricing 
and profits using a structural model of entry. Using data on geographically-isolated monopolies, 
duopolies, and oligopolies across several industries, they study the relationship between the 
number of firms (N) in a market and competition. The authors state: "Our empirical results 
suggest that competitive conduct changes quickly as the number of incumbents increases," with 
prices and profits falling with increases in the number of firms. They find "that prices fall as N 
increases." See id. at 1006. They also find that the largest price declines occur in moving to 
more than two firms in a market. They conclude, "To summarize, our tire price data confirm that 
entry lowers margins. Markets with three or more dealers have lower prices than monopolists 
and duopolists." A similar effect in moving from two to more than two firms is found in a 
separate study on geographically isolated retail automobile markets. BRESNAHAN & REISS 
(1990, p. 522) conclude that "the entry of a second dealer does not cause variable profits or 
margins to fall by much" but prices do fall with more than two firms. There is also a separate 
literature that estimates firm conduct in oligopoly industries taking the number of firms as given. 
In surveying this area of literature, BRESNAHAN (1989, pp. 1043, 1052) concludes, "These 
studies confirm the existence of a relationship between price and concentration, which is at 
least suggestive of market power increasing with concentration." He concludes that there is a 
positive relationship between concentration and pricing and that markups in these industries 
can be quite high. "There is a great deal of market power, in the sense of price-cost margins, in 
some concentrated industries." Nicholas ECONOMIDES  5 
organizational costs of collusion, (CARLTON & PERLOFF, 2005, pp. 134-
135, 379) make it easier for firms to monitor adherence to the collusive 
arrangement, and generally increase the incentive to collude (CARLTON & 
PERLOFF, 2005, pp. 136-137, 148-149, 379; TIROLE, 1988, pp. 247-248). 
CARLTON & PERLOFF (2005, p.  135) cite empirical evidence on the 
relationship between the number of firms and collusion and find that 
"empirical evidence supports the view that cartels are more likely in 
concentrated industries." 
While these empirical studies primarily focus on measuring price as 
evidence of market power (because it is easily measured), market power 
also conveys the ability to engage in the practices that open broadband rules 
are designed to protect against and described in Economides (2010a). 
Market power conveys the ability to create artificial congestion and foreclose 
competing content services from the network. On the Internet, in the 
absence of open broadband rules, broadband networks' market power can 
lead to the imposition of fees on content and applications providers that will 
reduce content provision as well as consumers' welfare. Most importantly, 
such fees will reduce the network effects on the Internet that create the 
virtuous cycle that has sustained the Internet's growth and tremendous 
positive impact on the U.S. economy.  
In the broadband Internet access market, a larger number of competitors 
would not necessarily result in a competitive outcome in the market. A 
particularly important factor limiting the effects of entry is the switching costs 
at the customer level. As explained in ECONOMIDES (2010a), customers 
face significant costs in changing last mile broadband access networks. 
Lower customer churn in a market in the presence of switching costs has 
been shown both theoretically and empirically to be associated with a less 
competitive and higher-priced outcome. 8  
High prices and low churn confirm market power of last mile broadband 
access providers. Schwartz, while stating that the wireline broadband access 
market is a duopoly, (SCHWARTZ, 2010, pp.  6, 31) claims that there is 
                       
8 KLEMPERER (1987) shows theoretically that if customers face switching costs between two 
providers of a differentiated good, pricing is likely to be more competitive the greater the fraction 
of customers that move into the market or across firms. SHARPE (1997) generalizes this result 
to an industry with any number of firms and tests it empirically using data from retail banking. 
He finds that the amount of customer migration (churn) has a significant competitive influence 
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"vigorous competitive rivalry."  9 However, his arguments are based on 
examples that do not hold up to scrutiny. First, while comparative advertising 
does occur, it is targeted mostly at marginal consumers in areas where 
consumers have access to more than two service providers. As noted 
above, FCC (2009) states that "50 - 80% of homes may get speeds they 
need from one provider." Further, Pew shows an average monthly bill of 
$44.70 for consumers served by only one provider, of $42.80 for consumers 
served by only two providers, of $38.10 for consumers served by only three 
providers, and of $32.10 for consumers served by four or more providers. 
(PEW, 2009, pp. 26-27). This data shows that duopolists charge 4% less 
than in monopoly, triopolists charge 14% less than in monopoly, and four or 
more competing access firms charge on the average of 28% less than in 
monopoly. This shows significantly accelerating reductions in price as more 
firms are added to duopoly, which unfortunately most consumers cannot 
benefit from as they find themselves in duopoly broadband access markets.  
Second, while technological upgrades of broadband access networks 
have been taking place, they lag behind upgrades occurring in other 
countries. The U.S. has been falling behind dramatically in international 
comparisons (ECONOMIDES, 2010a). Third, SCHWARTZ (2010) provides 
no reliable evidence that consumers change providers frequently, as 
discussed below. Fourth, prices have been increasing over time, as PEW 
(2009) reports for both average and median prices (see average prices in 
Table 1). Finally, while the percentage growth numbers in wireless may 
seem impressive, wireless broadband adoption is low and limited only to 
certain areas of the United States. FCC (2010) notes that less than 10% of 
all residential broadband connections are from mobile wireless. 
(ECONOMIDES, 2010a, 15, using the BTOP/BIP definition).  
PEW (2009) reports average monthly prices of residential broadband 
services as shown in Table 1. 10  
                       
9 He describes this rivalry in SCHWARTZ (2010, pp. 31-38) discussing comparative advertising, 
technology upgrades in response to competitors, price responses to competitors, customer 
switching, and quick growth in wireless broadband. 
10 Filing for Verizon to the FCC, BECKER & CARLTON (2010, 5) argue that the "rapid growth 
in recent years in broadband subscribers, Internet usage, service quality and reductions in price 
indicate that consumers have derived significant benefits from competition and innovation.". 
BECKER & CARLTON (2010, p. 13) cite a source for the claim that prices for DSL service fell 
from $40 in 2002 to $31 in 2006 and that prices for cable modem service have fallen as well. 
This trend is reversed in the more recent Pew data. Nicholas ECONOMIDES  7 
These data show that competition has weakened and prices have 
increased across the board. According to Pew, not only did the average 
price across all service levels increase from $34.50 in 2008 to $39.00 in 
2009, but the average price paid for premium service also has increased 
from $38.10 in 2008 to $44.60 in 2009 (PEW, 2009). Table 2 below, adapted 
from PEW (2009), illustrates these price increases. The survey conducted by 
Pew further reveals that a full third of all consumers who have not adopted 
broadband cite price as the barrier they face. The U.S. has been falling 
behind over time in international comparisons of penetration, and currently 
fourteen OECD countries have higher penetration than the U.S. - even 
though the vast majority of them have lower per capita income than the U.S. 
(ECONOMIDES, 2010a).  
Table 1 - Average price of U.S. residential broadband service 
Year  Average Monthly Price of U.S. 





Source: PEW (2009) 11 
Table 2 - Broadband Internet prices have been increasing both in mean and median 
Mean and Median Prices Paid for Broadband and Dial-Up Services, 2008-2009 
  2008 2009 
  Mean Median  Mean Median 
All Internet Users   $32.70 $30.00   $37.60 $35.00  
Broadband  $34.50 $32.00   $39.00 $38.00  
Dial-up  $19.70 $18.00  $26.60 $20.00 
By Connection Type      
DSL  $31.50 $30.00   $33.70 $30.00  
Cable  $37.50 $38.00   $43.20 $40.00  
Other High-Speed  $38.50 $40.00  $37.50 $35.00 
Service Type     
Basic   $32.80 $30.00   $37.10 $35.00  
Premium  $38.10 $35.00  $44.60 $40.00 
Source: PEW (2009, p. 29)   
The terminating access monopoly further undermines competitive 
responses to third party paid prioritization. Local exchange carriers ("LECs") 
                       
11 See PEW (2009, p. 25). Pew did not collect data for years 2006 and 2007. 8     No. 84, 4
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have "captive customers." Each LEC acting as a monopolist is able to 
charge termination fees to interexchange carriers ("IXCs"). This causes 
significant reductions in social welfare that have been widely understood. 
(FCC, 2001, 30-33). Similarly, in a world without open broadband rules, 
broadband Internet access providers can use their "captive customers" to 
extract fees from distant network participants, such as content and 
applications providers. TOPPER (2010) claims incorrectly that "the 
competitive environment of the broadband industry alleviates these 
concerns." (ECONOMIDES, 2010b) The degree of competition for last mile 
broadband access is limited, as discussed in detail in earlier sections and in 
ECONOMIDES (2010a). Broadband Internet access providers' significant 
market power gives them the ability to use captive customers to extract fees 
from content providers. This is exactly what broadband Internet access 
providers have proposed and why they oppose non-discrimination rules. Like 
LECs towards IXCs, last mile broadband providers would like to exercise 
their monopoly power not only towards their direct broadband customers but 
additionally towards other, third-party providers of Internet services, 
applications, and content. Broadband Internet access providers have 
proposed to bypass existing markets for Internet transit and impose fees on 
content and applications providers that have no contractual relationship with 
them. This would create a significant market distortion and social welfare 
loss (ECONOMIDES, 2008).   
Additionally, exercise of terminating monopoly power by last mile 
broadband providers can have unpredictable effects because there are 
many millions of types of content and applications providers, only a small 
minority of which have contractual relationships with residential customers. It 
would be very difficult for content and applications providers to impose fees 
on broadband customers across the board or to add new fees to their 
services. 12 There would be significant informational costs on upstream 
providers while the distortions of monopoly pricing would remain.  
Wireless is not a viable economic substitute for wireline broadband in the 
near future. A number of factors limit the potential of wireless broadband to 
serve as a disciplining force on the wireline broadband duopoly. These 
include factors such as high concentration and switching costs that limit 
                       
12 For example, take a website such as the New York Times. Should only U.S. consumers pay 
or should international users pay as well? Will there be no free content? Does every visitor have 
to establish a contractual relationship with the New York Times just so they can pass on the 
fees imposed by the last mile provider? Clearly, it is not possible for the majority of content 
providers to pass on fees to residential consumers. Nicholas ECONOMIDES  9 
competition within the industry and technological and economic factors that 
limit the substitutability of wireless and wireline broadband.   
Wireless broadband is not robustly competitive and features high barriers 
to entry. Scarcity of electromagnetic spectrum and very significant network 
investments limit the number of viable wireless competitors. Recent mergers 
have reduced the number of large companies so that presently the two 
largest wireless operators have a combined market share of 66% (before the 
proposed acquisition of T-Mobile by AT&T). This is a very concentrated 
industry. Further, competition among wireless broadband providers is limited 
due to high switching costs at the customer level. Incompatibility of 
transmission technologies limits customers' abilities to change providers 
without incurring the significant costs of buying a new handset. This is 
exacerbated by the fact that most wireless operators require that customers 
buy a new handset even when the old one is compatible with their network. 
Moreover, most customers are locked in multi-year contracts and would face 
significant termination fees if they were to switch to a network of higher 
quality or speed.  
Wireless broadband is not a viable economic substitute for wireline 
broadband in the near future. FCC filings opposing open broadband rules 
hypothesize that competition from wireless broadband will solve the problem 
of market power of the wireline broadband duopoly.  13 However, this is 
speculative at best because wireless broadband has not yet emerged as a 
viable competitor, and is unlikely to do so in the near future. First, because 
of different demand and supply characteristics, wireless likely will remain a 
complement rather than a substitute to wireline broadband. For speeds at or 
above 3 mbps, mobile wireless access has a negligible market share. Lower 
economies of scale at the network access level in wireless compared to 
wireline significantly limit wireless broadband providers' ability to match 
wireline prices. Second, even if wireless were a viable technological 
substitute for wireline broadband Internet access, wireless would not be an 
economic substitute for wireline broadband in many areas because the 
same company owns and controls both networks. Third, competition within 
the wireless industry is limited by large switching costs at the customer level.  
                       
13 See SCHWARTZ (2010, p.  6): "Wireless broadband already has multiple competitors, is 
rapidly growing, and there is increasing competition between it and landline broadband access 
to attract consumers." See also SCHWARTZ (2010, p. 31): "[…] with the spread of wireless 
broadband and all four national carriers upgrading their networks, the trend is towards a larger 
rather than smaller number of competitors in the provision of broadband access." 10     No. 84, 4
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DOJ (2009) notes that fourth generation wireless services are only just 
now emerging in a few areas and therefore, "we do not yet know… whether 
wireless broadband offerings will be able to exert a significant degree of 
competitive constraint on cable modem, DSL or fiber optic-based services." 
(SCHWARTZ, 2010, 8) This observation is reflected in data from FCC 
(2010a, p.  14). Mobile wireless access has a negligible market share for 
services with download speeds at or above 3 mbps, even though 
approximately two-thirds of all broadband subscribers have connections at 
or above 3 mbps (FCC, 2010, p. 18, Chart 13). 
Wireless broadband will not be a close substitute for wireline broadband 
in the near future for both demand- and supply-side reasons. On the 
demand side, DOJ (2009) notes that wireless broadband cannot yet provide 
speeds equivalent to those offered by wireline broadband. As a result, 
"Wireless may be a very attractive alternative for consumers who greatly 
value mobility and for consumers who do not place much value on the 
highest speeds." (FCC, 2010a, p.  8) On the supply side, wireless and 
wireline broadband have very different cost structures. Wireline involves high 
sunk costs to reach a customer's location and very low marginal cost to 
provide service to those already connected, while wireless involves smaller 
sunk costs but higher marginal costs to expand capacity to new customers 
or increase usage for existing customers (FCC, 2010, pp. 9-10). As a result, 
DOJ (2010) concludes, wireless broadband "appears to offer the most 
promising prospects for additional competition in areas where user density 
or other factors are likely to limit the construction of additional broadband 
wireline infrastructure." (FCC, 2010, p. 8). Thus, while playing an important 
role in some low-density areas, wireless broadband is unlikely to provide 
significant competition to wireline broadband in most areas in the near 
future.  
To the extent that wireless broadband may become a viable substitute for 
wireline broadband, the price pressure exerted may be limited by lack of 
competition within wireless broadband. The two largest wireless broadband 
service providers, AT&T and Verizon, also offer wireline broadband services 
in much of the country (FCC, 2010, p.  10). In these areas, wireline and 
wireless services will not compete with each other because they will not be 
priced independently. In fact, most wireless broadband service plans are 
made available at prices and speeds that limit the degree of economic 
substitution between wireless and wireline broadband. As DOJ (2009) notes, 
many wireless data services impose usage caps, while wireline services 
generally allow unlimited usage (FCC, 2010, p. 10). Even if these emerging 
technologies ultimately provide a close substitute technologically, it remains Nicholas ECONOMIDES  11 
to be seen whether wireless broadband pricing practices will shift materially 
to make those services a closer economic substitute for wireline services.  
SCHWARTZ (2010, p.  3) claims that "[…] market forces and existing 
norms against arbitrarily blocking or degrading traffic greatly constrain the 
ability to impose significant unwarranted fees." As discussed in detail above, 
last mile broadband providers have the market power, incentives, and 
abilities to impose significant fees on content providers. Market forces at the 
last mile broadband access level are ineffective to constrain broadband 
Internet access providers from imposing significant fees on content 
providers. Additionally, these last mile providers have publicly stated that it is 
their business plan to impose such significant fees and effectively to degrade 
traffic by creating priority lanes.  
Competition in the Internet backbone market will not constrain market 
power in the "last mile" because broadband access is complementary and 
serially related to the Internet backbone. As noted by ECONOMIDES 
(2010a, Section 1.2), the Internet is a network of interconnected networks. In 
some parts of the Internet, such as on the Internet backbone, there are a 
number of competing networks. For those parts, we can consider the market 
to be effectively competitive and not raise anticompetitive concerns in terms 
of allocative efficiency in the short run. In other parts, such as with last mile 
broadband access to residential users, we observe very significant 
concentration and market power. Since last mile broadband networks to 
residential users are serially related to (i.e., complementary to and not 
substitutable with) the Internet backbone, competitiveness in the Internet 
backbone market cannot constrain distortions in the last mile broadband 
access market.  
As further noted by ECONOMIDES (2010a, Sections 1.2 and 2.2), new 
tolls would allow broadband providers to bypass a well-functioning market 
and impose arbitrary contracts. Today, across the rest of the Internet, the 
collection of bilateral market relationships for network transport works 
relatively efficiently. Introducing new fees would circumvent the existing 
Internet transport market and negate the efficiency all agree it provides. 
Further, instead of the straightforward voluntary market transactions that we 
observe today, we will potentially see an exponential growth in demands by 
broadband providers to collect money from a large number of ISPs with 
which they do not have contractual relationships and from the much larger 
number of content and applications providers that are these ISPs' 
customers.  12     No. 84, 4
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Furthermore, imposition of discriminatory fees on content providers and 
its consequences (for example, packet delay) will be difficult for a consumer 
to decipher, and to determine that the packets are delayed due to the last 
mile broadband access provider's actions. Therefore, consumers will be less 
likely to switch providers than in markets where they are perfectly informed. 
Lack of transparency further inhibits market forces from constraining 
unwarranted fees. 14  
Broadband Internet access providers' market power gives them the 
incentive and ability to impose fees on third party content and applications 
providers, engage in price and non-price discrimination, and exclude 
competing content and applications. First, wireline broadband access 
providers have significant market power because of the small number of 
competitors, the presence of significant switching costs, and the lack of 
competition from wireless.  15 Second, broadband access providers can 
exercise their market power not only toward their direct customers but also 
by imposing fees on content providers and subjecting them to a variety of 
price and non-price discrimination schemes. Third, it will be very difficult for 
customers to discern whether a content provider's data packets are slowed 
down due to reasons related solely to the content provider or because the 
packets are being put in the "slow lane" by the customer's broadband 
provider. 16 Fourth, in the FCC proceeding the major broadband providers 
are proposing to start discriminating toward content and applications 
providers. 17 It is reasonable to assume that all major last mile broadband 
                       
14 ECONOMIDES (2010a) also notes that many consumers buy Internet service in a bundle 
with telephone service or cable service or with both, and these packages and combinations vary 
across providers. Thus it less likely for consumers to switch providers based on the 
deterioration of quality of only one of the products in a package. Additionally, AT&T and Verizon 
offer bundles that include wireline broadband service and wireless service. The inclusion of 
wireless service in the bundle, besides increasing switching costs, underlines the fact that these 
companies consider wireless service a complement rather than a substitute to wireline 
broadband service.  
15 This is evidenced by limited churn and relatively low market penetration. 
16 The loss of customers that BECKER & CARLTON (2010) assume would result from 
broadband providers' "bad acts" is likely not to materialize. See BECKER & CARLTON (2010, 
p. 12), "As a result of this competition [between broadband access providers], attempts by a 
broadband access provider to limit access to Internet content would be likely to result in the loss 
of subscribers that prefer unrestricted access, which provides a competitive constraint that limits 
incentives for such actions." 
17 See, e.g., Comments of AT&T, p. 10; Comments of Comcast, pp. 39-40. Nicholas ECONOMIDES  13 
providers will seek additional revenues from third party paid prioritization. 18 
Thus, the consumer cannot avoid the invidious practice by changing 
broadband providers.  
Antitrust and consumer protection will be insufficient to protect social 
welfare. Some, including KATZ (2010), filing in the FCC proceeding for 
Verizon, propose not to codify non-discrimination but to rely on "[…] an 
antitrust and consumer protection backstop to correct situations in which the 
market can be shown to have failed." 19 I believe that the sectoral regulator 
should enact the open broadband rules now rather than wait for resolution of 
antitrust suits later for a number of reasons. First, litigation takes time and 
irreversible damage may be done before it is resolved. Second, each suit 
would typically deal with only a single issue, between only two litigants and 
based only on the particular facts of that case. Delays may be compounded 
by the need for multiple suits to be fully adjudicated and for a coherent body 
of case law to be developed. Third, the Internet is a key essential network for 
growth of the economy with very significant network effects and positive 
spillovers. Waiting years for the outcome of one or more lawsuits would 
create investment uncertainty for all participants and be highly detrimental to 
economic growth. Fourth, introduction of last mile discrimination likely will 
have significant negative consequences on innovation on the Internet, 
whether or not antitrust violations occur in connection with the loss of 
openness. Therefore, it is in the public interest to enact rules to prevent 
discrimination.  
Even if open broadband rules negatively affect broadband Internet access 
providers' revenues, the effect is likely to be small; it is also possible that the 
open broadband rules will have a positive impact on these revenues  
Broadband providers' last mile infrastructure is used for a variety of 
purposes and services. As a result, only a small portion of revenues from the 
infrastructure derives from Internet access service, as shown below. 
Therefore, even if open broadband rules reduce broadband providers' 
Internet access revenues, this will have a limited impact on these firms' 
                       
18 Therefore, BECKER & CARLTON's (2010) assumption that only one of the two last mile 
duopolists would initiate price discrimination (and customers who objected could switch to the 
other provider) is inappropriate. 
19 KATZ (2010, p.  67) states: "A pro-consumer approach to policies that address the 
broadband industry would rely primarily on competitive market forces to deliver innovation and 
investment with an antitrust and consumer protection backstop to correct situations in which the 
market can be shown to have failed." 14     No. 84, 4
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overall revenues. From a social welfare standpoint, this limited impact is 
greatly outweighed by the positive impact of regulation, as discussed in 
ECONOMIDES (2010a) - preventing firms from creating artificial congestion 
to charge for prioritization and encouraging improved network investment. 
Moreover, it is invalid to assume that open broadband rules will reduce 
broadband Internet access revenues.  
The revenues from residential broadband Internet access represent only 
a small portion of total revenues from the overall usage of last mile 
infrastructure. Infrastructure for cable modem broadband service is shared 
with residential cable television service and VoIP service. Infrastructure for 
telco-based broadband service is shared with regular phone service and, 
increasingly, for multichannel video services. Both telco and cable 
broadband infrastructure also may support enterprise and specialized IP 
services to businesses and institutions. Most of the last mile providers' 
revenues are derived from these other, non-broadband Internet access, 
services. 20  
Industry-wide, OECD (2009) estimates that there were 81,170,428 
residential broadband subscribers in the U.S. as of June 2009 (OECD, 
2009). A similar number, 71,547,819, is obtained from Pew (2009). 21 Call 
these the "high" and "low" estimates of subscribers. For broadband, OECD 
estimates the average monthly price as $45.52 in October 2008, and PEW 
(2009) estimates it as $39.00 in April 2009. Call these the "high" and "low" 
prices. Multiplying the "high" price by the "high" number of subscribers and 
the "low" price by the "low" number of subscribers, the range of annual 
revenues from U.S. residential broadband services is between $33.5 and 
                       
20 It is difficult to get estimates of telco and cable companies' revenues attributable to 
broadband Internet access because typically companies do not break down their revenues in 
this way. However, a range of estimates can be established. For example, Verizon reports 
$46.1 billion in "wireline" revenues in 2009 of which $6.0 billion, or 13.0%, were derived from 
"broadband and video."See Verizon Communications 2009 Annual Report at 14 and 68. 
Comcast reports $85.5 billion in revenues from "video, high-speed Internet, and phone" services 
from 2007 through 2009. Of this, $21.4 billion, or 25.0%, was derived from "high-speed 
Internet." See Comcast 2009 Annual Report at 24. 
21 See PEW (2009, 9). Pew estimates that 63% of adults have broadband at home. Assuming 
one broadband line per household and that Pew did not survey adults from the same household 
twice, this implies 71,547,819 subscribers because there are 113,567,967 households in the 
U.S. based on Census numbers.  
http://www.census.gov/population/projections/nation/hh-fam/table1n.txt Nicholas ECONOMIDES  15 
$44.3 billion. Residential broadband revenues are a small percentage of 
total providers' revenue. 22  
Incumbent broadband providers have not shown that their broadband 
Internet access revenues will be diminished as a result of the proposed open 
broadband regulations. Without data, it is unclear what the effect of the 
proposed rules will be on broadband Internet access revenues. Additionally, 
demand for prioritization has not materialized, and so the market reaction to 
its possible introduction may be minimal. Also, even if the effect on revenues 
is negative, it will likely have only a small overall effect on last mile 
broadband providers' revenues. This is very small relative to the large social 
welfare gains to be achieved through open broadband rules that I detail in 
ECONOMIDES (2010a).  
Effects of two-sidedness of the market on social welfare  
Introduction of fees to third party content and applications providers can lead 
to higher prices for consumers.  
In general two-sided markets models, charging fees to third party 
applications and content providers may lead to price increases for 
consumers. 23 But SCHWARTZ (2010, pp.  16-18, 24-25) claims that "the 
implication that some price reduction [to consumers] will occur is quite 
general" as a result of imposing a price increase on the third party content 
providers' side of the market. He states that this "follows simply because the 
two sides of the market are complementary." This claim is incorrect. The fact 
                       
22 We compare these revenues to total revenues for cable and telecommunications companies. 
NCTA (2009) estimates cable industry revenues as $90.2 billion in 2009 and the FCC (2008) 
estimates telecommunications industry revenues as $299.5 billion in 2007. Revenues include 
local, wireless, intrastate, and interstate phone service revenues. Adding the cable and 
telephone industry revenues together we obtain total revenues of $389.7 billion. Therefore, 
using the "low" and "high" estimates of broadband revenues, residential broadband Internet 
access revenues as a percentage of their total revenues from the infrastructure range from 
33.5/389.7 = 8.6% to 44.3/389.7 = 11.4%. These are comparable to the Verizon number of 
13.0% and the Comcast number of 25.0%. 
23 Opponents of open broadband rules argue that charging content providers will reduce 
broadband users' prices. They further argue that the proposed rules are equivalent to a tax on 
broadband consumers because they preclude a price cut by last mile broadband providers once 
they start imposing additional fees on third party applications and content providers. 
SCHWARTZ (2010, p. 3) writes "positive fees to content providers would result in lower prices 
to broadband consumers" and KATZ (2010, p. 42) writes "[s]pecifically, network operators might 
use revenue from arrangements with online service or application providers to subsidize the 
costs of consumer access, which would increase adoption." 16     No. 84, 4
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that there is complementarity between provisioning content and applications 
and consumer access does not imply that there will be a price reduction to 
consumers or end-users as a result of a price increase (or introduction of 
fees) to third party content providers. Assuming complementarity, suppose 
that a broadband access provider imposes a fee on content and applications 
providers while keeping consumer prices the same. This will decrease the 
number of active content and applications providers and decrease 
consumers' willingness to pay for Internet access as well as their usage, 
because some content/applications providers will exit the market. Finding a 
lower demand for Internet access, the broadband provider may increase or 
decrease its consumer price, depending on the change in the elasticity of 
demand on the consumer side. As the consumer side demand shrinks, in 
general, it also changes elasticity.  
If the new demand function by residential consumers is less elastic to 
price than before the imposition of third party fees to content providers, the 
broadband provider will increase prices to consumers. So, complementarity 
of the two sides of the market has little to do with whether a broadband 
access provider can profitably increase prices on both sides of the market. 
Whether increasing price to consumers simultaneously with increasing price 
to content providers is profitable to a broadband provider or not depends on 
changes in demand elasticity as prices to content and applications providers 
are increased. In ECONOMIDES (2010b), I describe a standard model of a 
two-sided market where, for reasonable parameter values, the broadband 
access provider can have incentives to increase prices simultaneously for 
content and applications providers and end users. 24  
                       
24 SCHWARTZ's (2010, p. 18) claims that prices on the two sides of the market necessarily are 
inversely related is based on the very special demand function analyzed by ROCHET & 
TIROLE (2006). As WEYL (2009, pp. 22-24) shows, it is only in restricted modeling settings that 
ROCHET & TIROLE's (2006) reasoning holds. However, it need not hold, and hence no general 
inference can be made, that allowing broadband Internet access providers to impose a fee on 
content providers would lead to a decrease in Internet access prices. In fact, the reverse may 
happen with detrimental effects for both consumers and content providers. In the most general 
model of a two-sided market in the academic literature, WEYL (2009, pp. 22-34) shows that a 
last mile broadband access provider with significant market power can find it profit maximizing 
to increase prices in both sides of the market. Whether this action is desirable to the last mile 
broadband access provider depends on changes in the elasticity of end-user demand, which in 
turn depends on the dimensions of user heterogeneity. Thus, SCHWARTZ's (2010, p. 22) claim 
that pro-open broadband results in academic papers are based on limiting assumptions is 
incorrect. Additionally, SCHWARTZ (2010) states that existing economic models of two-sided 
markets assume the number of consumers is fixed on one side (p. 23): "These assumptions do 
not describe interactions in the Internet broadband industry today, let alone in the future. For 
example: (a) The number of group-1 members and their activity on the platform are assumed 
fixed. Thus, a price reduction to them cannot increase overall welfare, because it cannot Nicholas ECONOMIDES  17 
Even if prices to consumers would be lower, in a two-sided market setting 
with network effects, society may be better off under the open broadband 
rules, because consumers may have access to more content and 
applications. Because of network externalities, socially optimal prices are 
below the prices that maximize private profits, which do not internalize all 
externalities generated by the network. Hence, a zero fee policy toward third 
party applications and content providers corrects to some extent for an 
overall price level that otherwise would be too high for maximizing societal 
welfare.  
Introducing price discrimination and prioritization will significantly harm 
consumers and the functioning of the Internet  
BECKER & CARLTON (2010), SCHWARTZ (2010), and KATZ (2010) 
also claim that the introduction of price discrimination and even exclusive 
dealing will increase social benefits. BECKER & CARLTON argue that "price 
discrimination can result in prices to certain consumers that are below those 
that would prevail in the absence of discrimination, leading to an increase in 
sales to these consumers and to an expansion of total sales. Moreover, such 
price discrimination raises the firm's profits, which may create incentives for 
broadband access providers to invest in expanding or upgrading their 
networks compared to the investments that would be undertaken in the 
absence of discrimination." (BECKER & CARLTON, 2010, p.  10). This 
argument is about one-sided markets and tells us nothing about the paid 
prioritization arrangements that broadband providers want to impose. 25  
                       
increase 'output.' By contrast, lowering prices to Internet consumers will expand Internet 
penetration and use - both of which benefit also content providers." Schwartz has misread and 
misquoted the assumptions in ECONOMIDES & TAG (2009) and has not correctly taken into 
account the results of or assumptions in WEYL (2009). The two-sided market model applied to 
the open broadband context studied in ECONOMIDES & TAG (2009) explicitly shows that open 
broadband environment is preferable for society to fees imposed on third party applications and 
content providers when the fixed number of consumers assumption is relaxed and the number 
of consumers connected to the Internet and active content providers vary. See ECONOMIDES 
& TAG (2009, pp. 36-39). 
25 In one-sided markets, price discrimination has ambiguous effects on social welfare, and its 
introduction can decrease or increase social welfare. See, e.g., TIROLE (1988). BECKER & 
CARLTON (2010) also discuss the possibility that lower retail prices may increase social 
surplus. However, they do not address the price discrimination issue that is proposed by the 
broadband access providers. Last mile broadband providers are not proposing to decrease 
retail prices but rather to impose fees on third party applications and content providers. This is 
not addressed by BECKER & CARLTON at all, and there is no evidence that the introduction of 
such fees will lead network providers to decrease consumer prices, as discussed above. 18     No. 84, 4
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BECKER & CARLTON (2010) state that imposing price discrimination 
raises last mile broadband providers' profits. However, we cannot assume 
that those profits will be spent on increasing network capacity. 
ECONOMIDES (2010a) shows that, once prioritization is introduced, 
broadband providers have incentives to create artificial congestion in the 
slow lane to make the faster lane more valuable (ECONOMIDES, 2010a, 
pp.  8, 13; PEHA, 2007; LEE & WU, 2009; CHOI & KIM, 2008). Other 
opponents of open broadband rules have similar flaws in their arguments. 26  
In summary, existence of monopoly power in the residential broadband 
Internet access market is significant and imposing fees on content providers 
is an exercise of that power. With regard to investment incentives, I stress 
that telecommunications and cable companies have not suffered in terms of 
profitability during the last seventeen years when nondiscrimination and 
other fundamental tenets of open broadband generally prevailed. The 
codification of these existing tenets is unlikely to reduce last–mile broadband 
                       
26 For example, SCHWARTZ (2010, p.  8) similarly espouses the benefits of price 
discrimination, but all in the context of one-sided markets: "Even monopolists regulated as 
common carriers have been afforded considerable latitude to engage in price discrimination, 
loosely defined by economists as differences in a firm's prices that do not reflect cost 
differences. They typically have been allowed to offer menus of options at different prices, 
provided the offers are made available to all similarly situated customers, although such menus 
can be used to implement what economists call indirect (or 'second degree') price 
discrimination. Some selective offers that can implement direct (or 'third degree') price 
discrimination have also been permitted, such as railroad rates based on the type of the 
commodity being shipped." KATZ (2010, p.  8) states "[e]xamples from other industries also 
illustrate the potential value of discrimination. For example, student discounts for software 
packages can increase adoption. Similarly, the practice of selling pharmaceuticals for lower 
prices in developing countries can make drugs available that would otherwise be financially out 
of reach for citizens of those nations." The problem with these examples, once again, is that 
they are from one-sided markets, and therefore are irrelevant. The proposed open broadband 
rules will not outlaw retail tiered pricing towards end¬ users. But, the examples of price 
reductions given in the quote are only half of the price discrimination picture. Introduction of 
price discrimination also implies increases in price to some consumers. Even in one-sided 
markets, price discrimination can easily reduce societal welfare. In general, the coordinated 
introduction of price discrimination schemes may reduce output. There is a general theorem in 
economics that price discrimination, which reduces total output, also reduces total surplus 
contingent on serving all markets under uniform pricing. See ECONOMIDES (2008) and 
SCHWARTZ (1990). KATZ (2010, p.  40) states "[i]n addition to generating revenues to cover 
fixed costs, price discrimination can generate revenues that may incent investment. In 
comments filed with the Commission, the U.S. Department of Justice [DOJ] cautioned against 
price regulation because it could undermine investment incentives. Prohibiting price 
discrimination is a form of price regulation that can harm the returns to investment and, thus, 
investment incentives." The DOJ's full statement on this was: "In particular, price regulation 
would be appropriate only where necessary to protect consumers from the exercise of 
monopoly power and where such regulation would not stifle incentives to invest in infrastructure 
deployment." See DOJ (2010, p. 28). Thus, contrary to what Katz argues, DOJ fully supports 
using price regulation "to protect consumers from the exercise of monopoly power." Nicholas ECONOMIDES  19 
providers' profitability. As I have explained in detail in ECONOMIDES 
(2010a), commencing paid prioritization service would encourage broadband 
providers to increase network congestion and would be unlikely to increase 
investment in infrastructure.  
There are several reasons why price discrimination toward applications 
and content providers will not enhance welfare. First, there is no economic 
analysis of a two-sided market showing that price discrimination on the 
content and applications providers' side necessarily increases societal 
welfare. In fact, there is evidence of the opposite. For example, while 
HERMALIN & KATZ (2007) suggest that price discrimination will lead to an 
increase in total welfare, they also show that price discrimination can 
decrease welfare.  
Second, in a two-sided market setting with prioritization, it is obvious that 
discrimination and prioritization can be harmful because last mile broadband 
providers now have incentives to keep the network congested in order to 
extract profits from paid prioritization (CHOI & KIM, 2008; PEHA, 2007; LEE 
& WU, 2009). Further, as ECONOMIDES (2010a, Section 2.6) points out, 
there is a large literature describing the incentives of firms with market power 
to degrade low-end products to ensure consumers buy more expensive, 
high-end products. The bottom line is that broadband providers have these 
same incentives to create differentiation between their high- and low-end 
services by degrading the speed of their low-end services. Further, 
broadband providers have incentives not to invest in new capacity or even to 
introduce congestion effects by slowing down the low-end service even 
when sufficient capacity is available.  
Third, a key argument of opponents of open broadband rules is that price 
discrimination and prioritization can be optimal under congestion 
(SCHWARTZ, 2010, p. 5). However, ECONOMIDES & HERMALIN (2011) 
show that, even in the presence of congestion, there is a wide class of utility 
functions for which network neutrality is optimal. Fourth, charging differential 
prices to content providers for access to consumers is costly for broadband 
providers because they must carefully monitor and account for traffic over 
their network. This would divert resources away from investments in network 
upgrades and toward systems necessary to implement price discrimination 
(PEHA, 2007).  
Fifth, discrimination would allow last mile broadband providers to prevent 
Internet-based competitors from competing with their traditional revenue 
sources. As ECONOMIDES (2010a, Section 2.3) points out, 20     No. 84, 4
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telecommunications carriers' main business is phone service; cable 
operators' main business is providing multichannel video service. Thus, it is 
natural for these companies to have conflicts between traditional services 
and competitive Internet-based substitutes to them that consumers access 
via broadband last mile networks.  
Sixth, if broadband Internet access providers are allowed to provide 
priority service to content and applications providers, the market can easily 
succumb to a "prisoners' dilemma" in which content and applications 
providers will all lose and the only winner will be broadband providers. 
ECONOMIDES (2010a, Section 2.5) describes this dilemma. Suppose that a 
broadband provider offers prioritization guaranteeing that search information 
in the priority lane arrives ten seconds before search information in the 
standard lane. Given the prospect of losing almost all of their customers if 
they stay in the slow lane, every search provider that can afford it will choose 
to pay to be in the "priority lane." As ECONOMIDES (2010a, Section 2.5) 
argues, such a scheme would make all other parties - i.e., surviving firms, 
foreclosed firms, and consumers - worse off. Society loses in three ways: 
from innovation that will not occur because only firms with deep pockets can 
survive; from reduced variety of services due to foreclosed firms that have 
disappeared; and from lost consumer surplus because some content 
providers will disappear. 
Allowing exclusive dealing between broadband access providers and 
content/applications providers could be disastrous  
KATZ (2009, 2010)  27 claims it is widely accepted that exclusive 
contracts frequently promote competition and consumer welfare and that 
vertical integration can stimulate investment by internalizing uncompensated 
spillovers from the investing stage to another stage in the vertical chain. 
However, there is a large literature that shows anticompetitive 
consequences of exclusive contracts (ELHAUGE, 2009; AGHION & 
BOLTON, 1987; SEGAL & WHINSTON, 2000; BERNHEIM & WHINSTON, 
1998; KRATTENMAKER & SALOP, 1986a). Exclusive dealing can be 
disastrous on the Internet as it will allow a last mile broadband provider to 
select the winner on the content and applications side of the market. As 
Economides (2010a, Section 2.4) notes, a broadband provider may offer the 
following contract to search providers: only one search provider will receive 
prioritization, and all other search providers will go to the slow lane. This 
                       
27 See KATZ (2010, pp. 8-9, 36-37); KATZ (2009), filing with Verizon, pp. 46-48 Nicholas ECONOMIDES  21 
contract would create a number of distortions in the market for search: (1) 
the winner will be the one with the deepest pockets and not necessarily the 
one that is best in search; (2) it distorts the innovation race, because new 
companies are eliminated from the competition; (3) it raises the cost of 
innovation and diminishes innovation overall; and (4) in the presence of 
network effects and lock-in it can result in suboptimal choices in the long run. 
For example, if such a scheme was in effect in 2000, it may have picked 
Yahoo! as the winner in search and through lock-in, Google, Bing, and other 
search engines might never have developed. Moreover, once a winner is 
picked, there are technology-specific investments that broadband Internet 
access providers may make that will perpetuate an old winner.  
Finally, problems with price and non-price discrimination of a monopolist 
or oligopolist in market A that is vertically integrated in market B competing 
with a stand-alone company that participates only in market B are well-
known (ECONOMIDES & WHITE, 1995). Pricing above cost in market A has 
no influence on the vertically integrated monopolist but disadvantages the 
independent producer in market B, leading to lower output, higher prices, 
and lower social welfare. In terms of non-price discrimination, 
ECONOMIDES (1998) shows that the monopolist can employ strategies to 
raise rivals' costs that have very similar disadvantageous effects (SALOP & 
SCHEFFMAN, 1983; KRATTENMAKER & SALOP, 1986b). Exclusive 
contracts with one or more content providers also may allow a last mile 
broadband provider to (i) prevent entry in the content market; or (ii) profitably 
push out of the market a rival in a complementary service, say VoIP, if this 
reduces competition in a present or future market (AGHION & BOLTON, 
1987; BERNHEIM & WHINSTON, 1998).  
Concluding Remarks 
Some economists claim that natural competitive forces among last mile 
broadband access providers will discipline the market and prevent the 
detrimental impact that price discrimination and foreclosure of content and 
applications providers will have on growth and innovation. Unfortunately, 
such competition is not present among wireline broadband providers. 
Moreover, such robust competition is not present in the wireless market 
either, and wireless broadband acts more as a complement than a substitute 
for wireline broadband.  
Relying on narrow interpretations that are not robust to changes in 
assumptions, these commenters also claim that models of competition in 22     No. 84, 4
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two-sided markets reassure us that price discrimination against third party 
applications/content providers and exclusive dealing between broadband 
providers and content/applications providers will not result in higher prices to 
customers, a reduction in content availability, artificial congestion, or 
reduced innovation investment. In contrast, I show that careful examination 
of two-sided markets models offers no such reassurance. Instead, the 
proposed open broadband rules offer a straightforward and effective means 
of strengthening market interactions to ensure the openness of the Internet 
and the resulting growth and innovation that it provides to the U.S. economy.  
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